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ABSTRACT 
Author: William Woodrow Clark 
Title: Flight-Deck Automation: The Attitudes and 
Perceptions of Selected Boeing 757/767 Air 
Carriers Pilots 
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Degree: Master of Aeronautical Science 
Year: 1995 
Development in electronic displays and computers have 
enabled avionics designers to present the pilot with ever 
increasing amounts of information in greater detail and with 
more accuracy- However, technological developments have not 
always brought about enhancement of the pilot's role. 
Investigating the interaction of cockpit crew members and the 
vast array of automated systems they control and monitor will 
contribute to the determination the effect this interface has 
on the performance of the cockpit team. This study utilized a 
questionnaire to determine if the opinions of the flight crew 
suggested performance is impacted negatively by automation. 
There was no significant agreement suggesting that automation 
impacted the flight crew performance negatively by inducing 
complacency, loss of proficiency or by creating an unsafe 
environment. It did reveal that less experienced pilots were 
less proficient and felt more overwhelmed with the newer 
technology incorporating advanced automation. 
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CHAPTER I 
Introduction 
The goal of the airline industry is a simple one. To 
transport passengers from point A to point B in a 
comfortable, safe, and optimum manner. Although the goal is 
simple, the means by which it is accomplished is very 
complex. A principle facet in this endeavor is the 
interaction between the pilot, crew members, and the 
automated systems they control or monitor. It is the 
breakdown within this interface where many of the errors 
occur which lead to aviation mishaps. 
More than two-thirds of all air carrier mishaps are 
attributed to pilot error (Stix, 1991) . Another source 
suggests that seventy percent of the cases of airline 
accidents may be traced to human factors in crew 
performance. The remaining thirty percent may be linked to 
technical problems where human factors may also have been a 
factor (North, 1992). This rate is even higher for general 
aviation where almost 9 out of 10 mishaps are attributed to 
pilot error (Nagel, 1988). To rectify this, aircraft 
designers and operations managers utilize cockpit automation 
to reduce the number of human errors. The impetus is to 
"automate human error out of the system" (Curry, Wiener, 
1 
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1980). The belief is that control devices are extremely 
good at real-time control, but must be supported by the 
remarkable flexibility of the human as supervisor and 
standby controller, in case of breakdown or other unforeseen 
events (Curry, Wiener, 1980). 
Recent research has shown that automation, implemented 
with insufficient consideration to the human factors 
interface, can frequently create more problems than it 
solves (Bergeron, Hinton, 1985). The new cockpits realign 
work more than relieve it. Programming a computer to fly 
the aircraft results in a shift in the role of the pilot 
from one of controller to one of monitor (Hughes, 1992a, in 
press-a). Humans have proven that they are not so good at 
the monitoring task and are highly likely to miss critical 
signals, as well as to make occasional commissive errors 
(Curry, Wiener, 1980). 
There are many human factors areas involved in pilot 
error in which investigation is warranted: flight station 
organization, crew interaction, fitness for duty (fatigue, 
health), judgment, sensory illusion, distractions, and 
complacency induced by reliability of equipment (Lederer, 
1988). These factors singularly or in combination have a 
tremendous impact on the pilot. To limit the scope, this 
thesis will focus on the complacency and loss of proficiency 
induced by automation, and any safety consequences that 
result from this interface. 
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Statement of the Problem 
Development in electronic displays and computers have 
enabled avionics designers to present the pilot with ever 
increasing amounts of information in greater detail and with 
more accuracy. There is evidence that this new technology 
may change the pilot's workload to the detriment of 
performance. 
Significance of the Problem 
Degradation of the pilot's performance during flight is 
the opposite result sought by those incorporating automation 
into the flight compartment. Detracting from the ability of 
a flight deck crew member to perform optimally increases the 
opportunity for this trend to continue. It is apparent that 
the study of the effect flight-deck automation has on pilot 
performance is one of dire concern to commercial, military 
and general aviation aircraft designers, managers and 
operators. 
Review of the Literature 
Benefits of automation. The benefits of automation are 
quite numerous. They may be categorized into two types. 
First, automation allows certain functions to be performed 
that could not be accomplished otherwise. Second, automated 
systems are often able to provide more precise performance 
than humans (Boehm- Davis, Curry, Harrison, Wiener, 1983) . 
Accepting automation as an actual improvement to aviation, 
designers and system operators find several reasons for its 
implementation. 
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First, the improvement of microprocessor technology has 
enabled the aircraft designer to incorporate equipment which 
are smaller, cost less, use less power, and perform more 
reliably and precisely than the traditional manual 
equipment. This specifically addresses the problem of 
economy of cockpit space. It also provides display 
flexibility and more precise flight maneuvers and 
navigation. 
Second, economy of operation, improved reliability and 
decreased maintenance are directly improved. The flight 
profiles flown via computer are more precise and provide for 
exacting fuel efficient flight paths. The improved 
electronic equipment have experienced less down time than 
their analog counterparts. This directly decreases the 
amount of maintenance required. 
Third, safety considerations are always an issue, 
especially when over two-thirds of the mishaps are 
attributed to pilot error. Autopilots, flight directors, 
and alerting and warning systems are examples of automatic 
systems that have had a beneficial effect on pilot safety 
margins. The ground proximity warning system (GPWS) is an 
excellent example. It was mandated by Congress in 1974 and 
has been responsible for a major reduction in terrain 
strikes as a result (Curry, Wiener, 1980). 
Lastly, the reduction of pilot workload is believed to 
be a direct outcome of this automation. By relieving the 
pilot from the routine manual controlling and calculations, 
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they are free to more effectively supervise the flight and 
to concentrate and act more precisely during an emergency. 
Automation also frees the pilot during the most critical 
aspect of the flight, descent to landing, and allows them to 
keep their heads out of the cockpit and scan for other 
aircraft. Also as important is the performance of tasks in 
the new two-pilot wide-body aircraft that were previously 
done with three. Here it is particularly essential that 
automated systems take up the slack and reduce the workload. 
Reducing workload is a phrase often associated with 
flight station automation, but might be a misnomer. The 
role shifts from one of hands-on operator to one of monitor. 
While it is true that this reduces physical workload, 
cognitive processes are increased due to monitoring. A 
survey of 100 Boeing 767 pilots from three airlines reflects 
the controversy over this issue. When asked if "automation 
reduces overall workload," 47 percent agreed and 36 percent 
disagreed. Similarly, 53 percent agreed and 37 percent 
disagreed that "automation does not reduce overall workload, 
since there is more to keep watch over" (Curry, 1984) . One 
airline captain stated "I've never been so busy in my life, 
and someday this stuff is going to bite me" (Phillips, 
1992) . 
Automation induced problems. The thoughts of pilots 
with regards to automation is of mixed blessings. The 
innovations have made flying very efficient, but the flip 
side is reflected in this anecdote: the new design puts a 
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man and a dog in an airplane. The dog is there to bite the 
pilot if the man so much as tries to touch the controls. 
The pilot's one remaining job is to feed the dog (Stix, 
1991) . Automation has not gone this far, but the effect it 
has on the pilot requires attention. Other than take-off 
and landing, the pilot's role is basically reduced to one of 
systems monitor. The role of controller and monitor not 
only require different skills, but are also in conflict with 
one another. Controlling the system requires proficiency in 
the manual skills. Prolonged use of the automatic mode may 
lead to a deterioration of manual skills, the same skills 
which might be required due to systems failure or another 
emergency. 
The longer the pilot acts as a monitor, the more 
degraded his performance will become. During long transits 
the pilots are less challenged, prone to boredom, 
complacency, and in extreme cases falling asleep (Boehm-
Davis, Curry, Harrison, Weiner, 1983). Studies have shown 
that 55.2 percent of all aircraft mishaps occur during the 
descent through final approach phase (Nagel, 1988) . This is 
the most critical phase of flight, immediately following the 
period of peak complacency during the monotonous monitoring 
phase of the transit. Staying with or ahead of the aircraft 
when monitoring is a constant battle against boredom and 
complacency. The time required to "catch up" with the 
aircraft during the final phase and particularly during an 
emergency may be unavailable. 
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One study was conducted to determine the effect of 
variations in the reliability of an automated monitoring 
system on human operator detection of automation failures. 
Two groups were utilized, one with constant-reliability 
automation detection and one with variable-reliability 
automation detection. Subjects performed manual tracking 
and fuel-management tasks along with system-monitoring which 
was under automation control. Automation reliability, or 
the percentage of system malfunctions detected 
automatically, was held constant over time at a high or low 
level, or was alternated over time from low to high with the 
groups respectively. The results indicated that the group 
with the constant-reliability of automation failures were 
significantly worse than the variable-reliability group. 
The study provided empirical evidence of the consequences of 
automation-induced complacency on pilot performance (Molloy, 
Parasuraman, Singh, 1993). 
These problems are more pronounced with highly 
automated aircraft such as the Boeing-767. Certain tasks 
are more complicated to direct via the automated system than 
to perform manually. There has been a tendency for crews to 
attempt to program their way out of trouble with the 
automatic devices instead of disengaging and flying 
manually. This tendency exacerbates the deterioration of 
piloting skills due to the overuse of automation. It also 
creates a perception among pilots of "loss of control" or 
being "out of the loop" (Wiener, 1985). For example, one 
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pilot was asked by air traffic control to intercept an 
airway. The flight management system (FMS) provides no 
convenient way of performing this task. By the time the 
pilot figured out he could not, they were long past the 
airway (Hughes, 1992b, in press-b). 
Boeing is working to reverse this perception with the 
design of the Boeing 777. Their belief is that advances in 
automation should be evolutionary and strive to maintain the 
pilot in the decision loop. They are trying to design the 
flight deck that is appropriate to the pilot's operation and 
to enhance their situational awareness. To combat the 
specific criticism that the crew spends excessive amounts of 
head-down time scanning instruments, Boeing implemented 
several solutions which include the streamlining of (FMS) 
computer functions, the use of colors consistent between 
displays and the incorporation of data link ("Avionics 
Companies," 1992). Data link specifically reduces heads-
down time by linking the FMS computer with the 
communications facilities, automatically incorporating 
frequency changes and recording information and instructions 
(O'lone, 1992). 
Results of two other studies provide information of the 
difficulty pilots have with the understanding and operation 
of the FMS. The pilots did become proficient in the 
standard use of the system, but again had difficulty 
tracking its status and predicting its behavior during 
certain aspects of the flight. Difficulties with the 
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understanding of the functional system structure were also 
revealed. This again supports the need for better system 
design (Sarter, Woods, 1992). 
The design to limit the response to control inputs to 
maintain the aircraft within its safe operating envelope is 
a perfect example of this perception problem. This design 
has benefits and limitations which model the larger problem 
as a whole. The ability of an automated system to override 
pilot inputs are desirable in situations such as an 
encounter with wind shear. The Airbus Industrie uses fly-
by-wire on its A320 in part because of the increased safety 
it offers through the flight envelope and for wind shear 
protection (Lenorovitz, 1992). 
Wind shear is a phenomena associated with thunderstorms 
in which extreme downward airflow forces the aircraft to 
lose altitude. Here, the pilots must react quickly with 
large control forces to prevent ground impact. The largest 
danger is the possibility of stalling the aircraft while 
performing the escape procedures. By limiting the control 
inputs to those which will not produce a stall, the pilots 
are confident of flying to the edge of the envelope. 
The flip side occurs during evasive maneuvering to 
avoid a midair collision. By limiting inputs to those 
within design parameters, the pilots may be unable to avoid 
impact. In this scenario it would obviously be better to 
over-stress the aircraft and avoid a mid-air collision. 
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It is important that the issue of skills deterioration 
be revisited. The problem results not only from the failure 
to perform the manual skills on a routine basis, but at the 
same time, it is partially neglected during training. The 
development of a training program is difficult due to the 
dual capacity of the pilot: one as monitor of the system in 
the fully automatic mode, and one as controller of the 
system during any other mode. Determining the degree of 
training for off-line manipulation of the system is a 
difficult problem. The scenarios practiced during training 
may not occur, or occur with a sufficient span of time to 
preclude the pilot's proficiency. 
The difficulty with training is also hampered by the 
mixture of old and new equipment in the cockpits. Training 
programs which implement the latest in automated devices 
serve little purpose for a flight officer assigned to an 
older generation aircraft. 
Automation consequences. The aviation community is 
replete with mishaps attributed to pilot error. What must 
be considered is if the airplanes are too complex. Did 
automation in trying to eliminate pilot error create other 
errors by inducing overload, complacency or lack of 
proficiency? Presentation of examples should help in such 
analysis. 
The Lockheed L-1011 that crashed in the Florida 
Everglades in 1972 (NTSB, 1973) is an example of a system 
failing and the subsequent failure of the pilots to detect 
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it. The autopilot disengaged and the aircraft entered a 
gradual descent while in holding which resulted in impact 
with the ground. The crew were distracted by a landing gear 
emergency. This type of emergency does not require an 
immediate action and is considered a deferred malfunction. 
This means there is time to evaluate the malfunction and 
determine a proper course of action. Due to the inattention 
of the crew and subsequent failure to recognize the loss of 
the autopilot control of the aircraft altitude, the aircraft 
and all aboard were lost. It has been suggested that prior 
use of this automatic system induced the complacency of the 
crew to accept the invulnerability of the automation, and 
therefore divorce its function from their attention. 
The Korean Air Lines flight 007 shot down by a Soviet 
military aircraft while flying in Soviet airspace is another 
good example. The determination of the cause was considered 
to be the incorrect position entered into the inertial 
navigation system (Bailey, 1989). The failure of the crew 
to properly monitor their position via traditional means as 
a backup to the inertial guidance is another form of 
complacency. The crew could possibly have lost the ability 
to perform such a function due to their complete reliance 
upon the system. This complacency and lack of proficiency 
if induced by automation may manifest itself in future 
incidents and accidents. With the enormous numbers of 
people and equipment flying the skies of today and the 
future, it is imperative that the interactions between the 
12 
operators and their equipment be investigated to the most 
meticulous detail. 
Automation defined. Automation as used in this study 
is the utilization of equipment and devices to perform tasks 
originally accomplished by the pilot. The continuous 
advances in the aerospace industry in the field of 
airframes, systems and avionics have burgeoned into the 
ultra-modern cockpits of today- The fully automated 
aircraft include equipment performing every possible 
function. The "Glass Cockpit" of the most advanced aircraft 
introduce an entirely new design of flat displays, computer 
management and redundant systems to assist the pilot in the 
most efficient, effective and optimum way possible. It is 
not the intention of this study to determine the effect that 
a specific piece of equipment or a certain cockpit 
configuration has on the performance of the flight crew. It 
is the intention to determine the overall impact automation 
has on the flight crew performance and their interaction 
with such technology. Therefore, automation is defined as 
equipment utilized by a cockpit crew member to perform tasks 
previously performed by the pilot. This allows for the 
differences in opinions as to what truly is automated, and 
enables each individual pilot to express their personal 
interaction with the equipment. 
Statement of Hypotheses 
If the increase in flight-deck automation impacts the 
pilot in such a way as to induce complacency, loss of 
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proficiency or to create an unsafe environment, then it will 
be manifest in the attitude of the flight deck crew. There 
is no significant difference between the responses of the 
pilots from American Airlines (AAL) and the pilots of Delta 
Air Lines (DAL) nor between the captains and first officers. 
CHAPTER II 
Method 
Subjects 
Definition of the population incorporating flight-deck 
automation was determined by the definition utilized to 
describe the automation. As mentioned, most aircraft 
incorporate some degree of automation in the design of the 
flight deck. This automation was found in varying degree 
within the military, commercial and general aviation 
aircraft designs. The scope of this thesis was not to 
generalize to all three categories, and hence was narrowed 
to the commercial carrier aircraft community -
This commercial carrier population was also 
considerably varied and included many platforms with varying 
degree of cockpit automation. The objective was to analyze 
the effect automation within the cockpit has on pilot 
performance, and to determine whether that automation was a 
benefit or a detriment, with particular emphasis on safety. 
Therefore, some degree of differentiation was needed to 
achieve this determination. The population was thus defined 
in the following manner. 
Subjects for this study were selected from the 
population of pilots who currently utilize two specific 
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platforms, the Boeing 757 and the Boeing 767. These 
platforms were selected due to the similar design and 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) aircraft type rating 
criteria. One type rating is utilized for both cockpits. 
The population was further narrowed to include only carriers 
located within the United States. The sample of subjects 
were stratified by carrier, with subjects selected according 
to availability. 
The preferred method was to obtain the exact number of 
pilots within each carrier flying this specific equipment 
and select a random sample from each utilizing a table of 
random numbers. This research was classified as descriptive 
and a sample size of ten percent was appropriate. Obtaining 
these numbers and the required information to include the 
subjects in the sample was hindered by the privacy 
maintained within each company. 
The limited resources of the author required further 
reduction in sample size and location. The resulting 
approach was narrowed to target the three major carriers; 
American Airlines, Delta Air Lines and United Airlines, 
located in the local vicinity. The Los Angeles 
International Airport (LAX) was selected and permission was 
secured to conduct the survey for American and Delta pilots 
only. Each carrier consisted of approximately 200 pilots 
domiciled at LAX flying the selected equipment, 75 of which 
were selected from each for the study. The 75 were than 
randomly selected by no established pattern. 
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It is obvious that bias exists in the selection of 
subjects for the sample population. Convenience sampling 
was utilized to generate the group which created significant 
bias due to the non-probability of the sampling technique. 
This bias was increased due to the utilization of carriers 
within the vicinity of the author. This limited the 
geographic exposure as well as the number of different 
carriers there were to choose from. These factors were 
important since each carrier has its own training program 
addressing many of the issues investigated in this study in 
a significantly different manner. 
Instruments 
A questionnaire was developed to collect information 
from pilots of the Boeing 757 and 767 aircraft. The 
questions were directed at the effect automation is having 
on individual performance, cockpit coordination and 
management, safety issues, and overall impact. The 
instrument was created specifically for this study, and thus 
validity and reliability data are unavailable. A pilot 
study was conducted to determine the appropriateness of 
content, clarity of instruction, and effectiveness of 
obtaining the desired information prior to the instruments 
finalization and delivery. 
Research of this nature required development of an 
instrument since specific information was needed in this 
unique field. The reliability of this instrument is 
dependent upon the individual interpretation of the relative 
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scale agreement or disagreement for a each question. The 
cover letters with instructions as well as the questionnaire 
are included for critical review in Appendix B and C 
respectively. 
Design 
This thesis is classified as evaluation, utilizing the 
systematic process of collecting and analyzing data in order 
to make decisions. This evaluation assessed the current 
environment in one of the most advanced platforms flying 
today. The natural setting characteristic of this 
particular evaluation precluded the control prevalent in 
most research. Hence, the sole purpose of this evaluation 
research was to facilitate better decision making for future 
cockpit design. 
This thesis design was chosen because of the inherent 
complexities, associated with cockpit management and piloting 
skills. Elaborate methods of conducting experimental 
analysis have been undertaken, but the funds for these 
endeavors were vast in comparison to those available for 
this study. Companies and agencies have expanded on the 
central idea of this thesis utilizing wide differences in 
design to achieve essentially the same objectives. 
There are numerous variables which could not be 
controlled in this design, or were beyond its scope. The 
large variation in cockpit utilization of automation was 
one. This was reduced by the selection of a specific 
population and aircraft, which subsequently detracts from 
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the ability to generalize from the study. Also, the 
procedures performed by flight crews are carrier dependent, 
and the study was incapable of addressing individual 
differences. The forthright honesty of the respondents was 
also a variable, since it cannot be determined through 
observation if the responses match the actual environment 
occurring in flight. 
Procedures 
A pilot study was conducted introducing the 
questionnaire developed for the study. Pilots from numerous 
airlines and platforms were utilized. These pilots were 
fellow Reserve Naval Aviators attached to Patrol Squadron 65 
at the Naval Air Weapons Station (NAWS) Pt. Mugu, 
California. Feedback from these pilots helped finalize the 
questionnaire. 
The sample population was then selected from the 
available population of pilots at the Los Angeles airport. 
Three major carriers were targeted according to their 
accessibility. These were American Airlines, Delta Air 
Lines and United Airlines. Permission and assistance was 
requested from each of the three carrier Chief Pilots by 
fellow pilots who hand delivered the questionnaire and 
appropriate cover letter. Personal contact was then made 
asking permission to conduct the survey, and to request that 
the Chief Pilots provide any required assistance to the 
selected pilots. American and Delta gave approval. It is 
interesting to note that the reluctance of United was due to 
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the recent broadcast of the vulnerability of the Traffic 
Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) depicting 
negative attitudes toward the equipment. This airline felt 
that the facts were misrepresented in the program and hence 
refused to participate in this study to preclude a similar 
occurrence. 
The carrier specific cover letters were then produced 
and delivered with appropriately labeled, self-addressed, 
stamped return envelopes along with the questionnaires. 
Each packet was numbered and then hand delivered into 
individual pilot mailboxes at the LAX hub according to the 
depiction indicating the platform flown by the pilot. The 
questionnaires were randomly distributed at whim. No 
identifying criteria were collected. The subjects were 
given two weeks to complete the study. 
The questionnaire collected information concerning the 
pilots' utilization of automated equipment, their general 
and specific attitude towards its usage, and specific 
impacts that automation has on piloting. Analysis of this 
information determined if there was significant agreement on 
the impact that automation is having on pilot performance 
and safety. 
CHAPTER III 
Data Analysis 
The data collected from this questionnaire is defined 
as nominal data, with answers given according to a relative, 
ordinal scale. The nominal data consists of true categories 
for the first two questions, cockpit position and years 
experience, followed by artificial categories for the 
remainder. The artificial categories allow for a one of 
five choice in varying degrees of percentages or agreement 
for a specific question/statement. The data collected may 
be considered ordinal by classifying the responses in terms 
of the amount by which they agree, however they are truly 
nominal and hence limit the type statistics which may be 
performed. 
The population as previously defined are represented by 
the sample selected for this study. This sample of the 
population provided the data necessary to perform the 
statistical computations. This study utilized percentage 
response calculations and the chi-square (X2) . The latter 
calculation is a nonparametric test of significance, and was 
utilized to determine if their were significant differences 
between the groups involved in the study. This allowed for 
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a combination of comparisons and relationships to be 
determined from the data collected. 
First, the data was stratified into two separate 
groups, the pilots of American Airlines (AAL) versus the 
pilots of Delta Air Lines (DAL). The outcome of these 
calculations determined if the questionnaires could be 
combined or kept separate for additional comparisons. 
Specifically, if their was no significant difference 
between the pilots of the two airlines on a particular 
question, then the entire number of respondents were 
combined on that specific question to determine the next 
comparison. 
The second step was the comparison between the captain 
and first officer positions. If their was a significant 
difference between the two airline groups on a specific 
question, then two separate calculations were made to make 
comparisons within each carrier. This was necessary to 
allow for the proper application of inferences from the 
data. For a summary of the outcome of these calculations, 
refer to appendix A. 
Demographics 
Sample size. Of the one hundred fifty questionnaires 
delivered, seventy-five per carrier, forty-nine were 
returned from American and fifty-two from Delta. American 
respondents were comprised of twenty-seven captains and 
twenty-two first officers. Delta consisted of twenty-four 
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captains and twenty-eight first officers. Table 1 lists the 
years experience of the pilots responding. 
Table 1 
Years experience in the B-757/767 
Group nD 
Response (Years) N(%) 
<1 1-2 3-4 5-6 >6 
American 
Captain 27 
First Officer 22 
Delta 
Captain 24 
First Officer 28 
1(4) 4(15) 11(41) 3(11) 8(30) 
1(4) 11(50) 7(32) 0 (0) 3(14) 
3(13) 6(25) 2 (8) 2 (8) 11(46) 
10(36) 11(39) 4(14) 0 (0) 3(11) 
aN is the number of respondents answering this category and 
the respective percentage of the total responding. bTotal 
number of respondents from this group. 
There was a significant difference in the number of 
years experience between the carriers. Hence, we reject the 
null hypothesis that there was no significant difference 
with the experience level of these pilots. Specifically, 
American consisted of thirty-three pilots with one to four 
years experience in the Boeing 757/767 and fourteen with 
five or more years. Delta consisted of thirty pilots with 
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two or less years experience in the same cockpit and sixteen 
with five or more years. 
Additionally, there was a significant difference found 
between the years experience between the captains and first 
officers for the pilots of Delta. Twenty-one of the thirty 
Delta pilots with two years or less experience were first 
officers. Eleven of the fourteen with six or more years 
were captains. The captains have significantly more 
experience than the first officers for Delta at the LAX hub. 
It is necessary to be particularly alert to this difference 
to determine if there are significant differences between 
these two groups on the remaining questions. 
To begin the search for data suggesting that extensive 
automation usage may create an unsafe environment, the first 
step was to determine the perception that the users have of 
the equipment. Thus far, we have defined a population that 
is varied in experience and equally divided in cockpit 
position. 
Automation composition. When asked what percentage of 
flying skills are automated, seventy-two percent of the 
pilots responding said that greater than half of the tasks 
were automated. One Delta pilot stated that "everything 
from above 18000' to the final approach fix (FAF)-unless it 
is in the way", was automated. An American pilot stated 
that "virtually all pilot actions can be automated, however, 
pilots that wish to maintain proficiency will seldom depend 
on automated systems during critical phases of flight 
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(takeoff, departure, approach & landing)". Table 2 lists 
the responses to this question. 
Table 2 
Percentage of flying skills that are considered automated 
Response (Percentage) N(%)rt 
Group nb <25 25-50 51-75 76-90 >90 
American 47 1 (2) 11(23) 15(32) 18(38) 2 (4) 
Delta 50 6(12) 9(18) 15(30) 14(28) 6(12) 
aN is the number of respondents answering this category and 
the respective percentage of the total responding. bTotal 
number of respondents from this group. 
When asked what percentage of time that the pilot 
utilized these automated systems, sixty-three percent of the 
American pilots said that greater than seventy-six percent 
of the time automation is used. Only forty-seven percent of 
the Delta pilots said that more than seventy-six percent of 
the time they used automation, while eighty-four percent 
said greater than fifty percent of the time they used it. 
One pilot drew a graph of cockpit workload during the entire 
flight and then delineated the percentage time that 
automation is used. That representation summarized the 
position of most of the respondents and indicated that a 
pattern of automation use occurs throughout the flight. 
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This pattern depicted that automation was available 
throughout the flight evolution, but was completely 
dependent upon personal choice of whether the automation was 
utilized. Table 3 lists the responses to this question. 
Table 3 
Percentage of time automated systems are utilized 
Response (Percentage) N(%)a 
Group nb <25 25-50 51-75 76-90 >90 
American 49 0 (0) 5(10) 13(27) 29(59) 2 (4) 
Delta 52 2 (4) 7(13) 19(37) 19(37) 5(10) 
aN is the number of respondents answering this category and 
the respective percentage of the total responding. bTotal 
number of respondents from this group. 
Having questioned the amount of automation and the time 
required to utilize it, a probe into the general attitude 
the user has towards its implementation was in order. The 
next question asked if the pilots felt that too many 
activities were automated. Fifty-eight percent of all 
pilots stated that they disagreed. Seven percent strongly 
disagreed while twenty-five percent were neutral. Refer to 
table 4 for comparison. 
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Table 4 
Are too many systems, procedures, tasks automated? 
Response (Percentage) N(%)a 
Group nb SD D N A SA 
American 49 5(10) 29(59) 12(24) 3 (6) 0 (0) 
Delta 51 2 (4) 29(57) 13(25) 4 (8) 3 (6) 
Note. SD = strongly disagree; D = disagree; N = neutral; 
A = agree; SA = strongly agree. aN is the number of 
respondents answering this category and the respective 
percentage of the total responding. bTotal number of 
respondents from this group. 
The survey now began to focus and exact more specific 
information from the respondents. The next group of 
questions were utilized to attack the crux of the research 
hypothesis. 
Safety impact. The pilots were asked point blank if 
any form of automation created an unsafe environment in the 
cockpit. There was a significant difference between the 
pilots of American and Delta with their responses to this 
question. There was no clear line of support or lack of 
support for this question as depicted in Table 5. 
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Table 5 
Has automation created an unsafe environment? 
Response (Percentage) N(%T 
4 ( 1 5 ) 
2 ( 1 0 ) 
0 (0) 
0 (0) 
8 ( 3 0 ) 
9 ( 4 3 ) 
1 2 ( 5 0 ) 
8 ( 2 9 ) 
9 ( 3 3 ) 
2 ( 1 0 ) 
4 ( 1 7 ) 
5 ( 1 8 ) 
6 ( 2 2 ) 
8 ( 3 8 ) 
8 ( 3 3 ) 
1 3 ( 4 6 ) 
0 
0 
0 
2 
(0) 
(0) 
(0) 
(7) 
Group nb SD D N A SA 
American 
Captain 27 
First Officer 21 
Delta 
Captain 24 
First Officer 28 
Note. SD = strongly disagree; D = disagree; N = neutral; 
A = agree; SA = strongly agree. aN is the number of 
respondents answering this category and the respective 
percentage of the total responding. bTotal number of 
respondents from this group. 
Thirty-five percent of the American pilots disagreed 
and thirteen percent strongly disagreed that automation 
created an unsafe environment in the cockpit. Similarly, 
thirty-eight percent Delta pilots disagreed as well. 
Conversely, twenty-nine percent of American pilots agreed 
with the question while forty percent Delta pilots agreed 
and four percent strongly agreed. Several of the comments 
suggested that the automation could create such dangers when 
familiarity was less and a pilot was still learning the 
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system. One pilot said "until the last couple of years when 
we were taught automation download, there were too many guys 
playing with the FMS below 10,000' in high density 
environment. Now most of us use manual auto flight 
functions when changes need to be made to the FMS in high 
density airspace below 10,000/l!. 
This last question was not definitive hence the pilots 
were asked if a specific task performed by automation 
created a situation requiring manual backup or performance 
of the task using basic pilotage. Sixty-eight percent of 
all pilots agreed and twelve percent strongly agreed. One 
pilot said that "the professional pilot is always mentally 
flying the aircraft; therefore, he backs up automation with 
pilotage". Table 6 lists the responses to this question. 
Table 6 
Has any automated task required manual backup? 
Response (Percentage) N(%)a 
Group nb SD D N A SA 
American 47 0 (0) 6(13) 4 (9) 32(68) 5(11) 
Delta 52 0 (0) 5(10) 5(10) 35(67) 7(13) 
Note. SD = strongly disagree; D = disagree; N = neutral; 
A = agree; SA = strongly agree. aN is the number of 
respondents answering this category and the respective 
percentage of the total responding. bTotal number of 
respondents from this group. 
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To continue this line of questioning, more specific 
questions regarding the use of automation were utilized. 
These questions were aimed at obtaining responses to the 
specific instances that may have caused difficulties or 
worse. The use of the majority of the cockpit equipment 
requires a pilot to perform tasks inside the cockpit with 
their full attention applied to the problem, task or 
procedure. Many incident reports have documented near 
misses of aircraft while airborne as well as during ground 
evolutions. Hence, this was a logical continuance of the 
investigation. 
Specific equipment impact. The pilots were asked if 
the flight management computer kept them inside the cockpit 
too much, particularly during the low altitude phases of 
flight during higher traffic volume. There was a 
significant difference between the responses of the American 
and Delta pilots on this question. Fifty-five percent of 
American pilots disagreed when asked if the flight 
management computer (FMC) kept them inside the cockpit too 
much instead of outside scanning for aircraft. One American 
pilot stated that "until the pilot is very familiar with the 
FMC, too much time is spent inside the cockpit during 
critical phases of flight. However, as experience increases 
in type, a transition occurs where more time can be spent 
outside the cockpit". 
Thirty-three percent of Delta pilots agreed and the 
same number disagreed on the same question. One pilot said 
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that "if you followed company procedures below 10,000', this 
is no problem" . Another pilot said that the FMS designer 
did not consider runway changes in the equipment 
development, which was suggested by several other pilots. 
One comment iterated that last minute changes and re-routes 
as well as runway changes could be distracting, let alone 
any kind of emergency or inclement weather. The results of 
this question are listed in Table 7. 
Table 7 
Flight management computer's impact on outside scan 
Response (Percentage) N(%)a 
Group nb SD D N A SA 
American 
Captain 27 1 (4) 16(59) 3(11) 5(19) 2 (7) 
First Officer 22 0 (0) 11(50) 4(18) 7(32) 0 (0) 
Delta 
Captain 23 0 (0) 9(35) 5(22) 10(43) 0 (0) 
First Officer 28 5(18) 8(29) 8(29) 7(25) 0 (0) 
Note. SD = strongly disagree; D = disagree; N = neutral; 
A = agree; SA = strongly agree. aN is the number of 
respondents answering this category and the respective 
percentage of the total responding. bTotal number of 
respondents from this group. 
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The next question was related to this last one and 
received similar responses. Forty-one percent of all pilots 
disagreed that automation requirements were too time 
consuming particularly during the critical phases of flight. 
Twenty-seven percent agreed however while six pilots wrote 
comments that the time requirements could be dangerous, but 
only if you allowed them to be. The responses for this 
question are listed in Table 8. 
Table 8 
Automation time requirements for critical phases of flight 
Response (Percentage) N(%)a 
Group nb SD D N A SA 
American 49 2 (4) 24(49) 12(24) 10(20) 1 (2) 
Delta 52 6(12) 17(33) 13(25) 15(29) 1 (2) 
Note. SD = strongly disagree; D = disagree; N = neutral; 
A = agree; SA = strongly agree. aN is the number of 
respondents answering this category and the respective 
percentage of the total responding. bTotal number of 
respondents from this group. 
Many ideas have been developed to help alleviate these 
last two problems by creating procedures and/or equipment 
to assist the pilots during the more critical phases of 
flight. This next piece of equipment is one such device and 
has also been in the spotlight previously. Fifty-two 
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percent of all pilots disagreed and thirteen percent 
strongly disagreed when asked if TCAS deterred a good look 
out doctrine. Of the eighteen percent of pilots that 
agreed, forty-three percent disagreed or strongly disagreed 
and forty-seven percent were neutral when asked if this 
dependency will lead to an aviation mishap. The majority of 
the comments supported the equipments' use and praised the 
capabilities and performance of the TCAS. One Captain 
stated "TCAS is a great tool. I've seen more aircraft than 
I've ever seen before. At least when you are alerted, it 
does get your eyes out of the cockpit and gives a general 
place to look. I think it greatly increases situational 
awareness. In my cockpit, we NEVER rely just on TCAS, 
though". The responses to the first question about TCAS are 
listed in Table 9. Question #16 is not tabulated. 
33 
Table 9 
Does TCAS dependency substitute a good lookout doctrine? 
Response (Percentage) N(%)* 
Group nb SD D N A SA 
American 49 9(18) 25(51) 6(12) 9(18) 0 (0) 
Delta 52 4 (8) 27(52) 12(23) 9(17) 0 (0) 
Note. SD = strongly disagree; D = disagree; N = neutral; 
A = agree; SA = strongly agree. aN is the number of 
respondents answering this category and the respective 
percentage of the total responding. bTotal number of 
respondents from this group. 
Flight proficiency and workload. This next question is 
often asked and is of an ongoing concern with the FAA, the 
airlines and the pilots as well. There are many advocates 
of automation but even within their ranks, the topic of 
skills deterioration is of utmost concern. There was a 
significant difference with the responses between the pilots 
of American and Delta on the critical question of whether 
automation use was causing deterioration of manual flying 
skills. The results produced forty-nine percent 
disagreement from American and twenty-nine percent 
disagreement from Delta pilots. Thirty-five percent 
American and thirty-eight percent Delta pilots agreed 
however. The comments varied equally as well. Several 
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comments stated that the professional pilot will fly the 
aircraft manually enough to remain proficient. At the same 
time, several other comments suggested that there is no 
standard to maintain manual proficiency and that many pilots 
do not fly manually unless they have to. Table 10 lists the 
responses to this critical question. 
Table 10 
Is automation causing the deterioration of manual skills? 
Response (Percentage) N(%) a 
Group n° SD N SA 
American 
Captain 27 
First Officer 22 
Delta 
Captain 24 
First Officer 28 
0 (0) 14(52) 
3(14) 10(45) 
0 (0) 7(29) 
5(18) 8(29) 
2 (7) 11(41) 0 (0) 
1 (5) 6(27) 2 (9) 
6(25) 11(46) 0 (0) 
6(21) 9(32) 0 (0) 
Note. SD = strongly disagree; D = disagree; N = neutral; 
A = agree; SA = strongly agree. aN is the number of 
respondents answering this category and the respective 
percentage of the total responding. bTotal number of 
respondents from this group. 
When asked specifically if they fly the aircraft 
manually frequently enough to maintain skills at a level 
capable of performing functions off-line during an 
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emergency, fifty-eight percent of all pilots agreed and 
twenty-six percent strongly agreed that they did. Only 
twelve percent disagreed. The replies for this question are 
in Table 11. 
Table 11 
Proficiency level of manual skills sufficient to perform 
emergencies 
Response (Percentage) N(%)a 
Group nb SD D N A SA 
American 49 1 (2) 3 (6) 6(12) 26(53) 13(27) 
Delta 52 0 (0) 2 (4) 5(10) 32(62) 13(25) 
Note. SD = strongly disagree; D = disagree; N = neutral; 
A = agree; SA = strongly agree. aN is the number of 
respondents answering this category and the respective 
percentage of the total responding. bTotal number of 
respondents from this group. 
The next question asked if automation increases the 
pilots' workload. There was a significant difference with 
the responses between the pilots of American and Delta. 
Sixty-one percent of the American pilots disagreed that 
automation increases workload. Forty-six percent of the 
Delta pilots agreed that workload was increased. The 
comments continue this disparity by suggesting that 
different phases of flight as well as different situations 
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create different levels of work. One pilot stated 
"automation reduces workload (for the better) during low 
stress periods. However, during high workload periods such 
as descent/approach with minor or major flight plan changes, 
automation can become a problem. During high work load 
periods I think it is better to decrease use of FMS and 
revert to basic flying procedures. It is less stressful and 
keeps ones eyes out of the cockpit. Automation may increase 
work load during high activity periods because we have to 
monitor what we put into the FMS, what it is doing, and 
monitor the airplane". The results of this question are 
listed in Table 12. 
Table 12 
Does automation increase your workload? 
Response (Percentage) N(%)a 
Group nb SD D N A SA 
American 48 8(17) 21(44) 7(15) 12(25) 0 (0) 
Delta 52 2 (4) 20(38) 6(12) 20(38) 4 (8) 
Note. SD = strongly disagree; D = disagree; N = neutral; 
A = agree; SA = strongly agree. aN is the number of 
respondents answering this category and the respective 
percentage of the total responding. bTotal number of 
respondents from this group. 
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The next questions address the second and equal area of 
concern for those supporting automation and those opposing. 
The environment where tasks are performed by machines 
creates the situation where one is concerned that the 
operator may grow dependent upon that function, and 
eventually lose all precaution to the equipments 
vulnerability. 
Induced complacency. When asked if extensive use of 
automation will induce complacency, fifty-seven percent of 
all pilots agreed while nine percent strongly agreed. Every 
comment stated similar responses, that the professional 
pilot will not allow this to happen by flying the aircraft 
manually or performing other tasks manually Table 13 lists 
the responses to this latest question. 
Table 13 
Does automation induce complacency on the flight deck? 
Response (Percentage) N(%)a 
Group nb SD D N A SA 
American 49 1 (2) 10(20) 5(10) 29(59) 4 (8) 
Delta 52 2 (4) 8(15) 9(17) 28(54) 5(10) 
Note. SD = strongly disagree; D = disagree; N = neutral; 
A = agree; SA = strongly agree. aN is the number of 
respondents answering this category and the respective 
percentage of the total responding. bTotal number of 
respondents from this group. 
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The pilots were then questioned pointedly whether 
automation had made them complacent, specifically in a way 
that detracted from their optimum performance. Fifty 
percent disagreed and four percent strongly disagreed. At 
the same time, twenty-nine percent agreed that automation 
had made them complacent. These results are listed in Table 
14. 
Table 14 
Has automation made you complacent? 
Response (Percentage) N(%)a 
Group nb SD D N A SA 
American 49 3 (6) 22(45) 9(18) 15(31) 0 (0) 
Delta 52 1 (2) 28(54) 9(17) 14(27) 0 (0) 
Note. SD = strongly disagree; D = disagree; N = neutral; 
A = agree; SA = strongly agree. aN is the number of 
respondents answering this category and the respective 
percentage of the total responding. bTotal number of 
respondents from this group. 
This concluded the questions designed to facilitate the 
research hypothesis. The remaining questions were asked to 
help determine the overall feeling that the pilots have 
towards the trends in automation design and implementation. 
Future implementation. There was a significant 
difference between the responses of the pilots from American 
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and Delta when asked if future implementation of automation 
into the cockpit would create a more stressful and higher 
workload environment. There was similar disagreement 
however, with 53% of American and 55% of Delta disagreeing. 
The last question produced 52% disagreement when asked 
about the future roles that automation would play in cockpit 
design and pilot interaction. The question was geared 
towards the future use of automation which would shift the 
pilots role from one of controller to one of monitor. The 
comments from the pilots suggested that the lessons learned 
from the automated systems and the difficulties encountered 
will help designers and operators to preclude this shift in 
roles and maybe prevent future aircraft incidents and 
accidents. One pilot stated "that the inability to 
disconnect the automated system on the Airbus Industrie 
aircraft which lead to the total loss of aircraft and crew" 
was a perfect example of the operational application of the 
learned errors of automation. Questions #15 and #16 are not 
tabulated. 
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CHAPTER IV 
Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations 
Findings 
There were one hundred fifty pilots selected to 
participate in this study. American Airlines had a 65.3% 
return rate while Delta Air Lines had 69.3% This presented 
sufficient data to conduct the analysis and thus the data 
was equally representative of the carriers. The paragraphs 
that follow will highlight the findings of this 
investigation. 
1. There was a significant difference in the years 
experience between the carriers, and between the captains 
and first officers of Delta Air Lines. The data suggest 
that the pilots of American have significantly more 
experience than those of Delta at the LAX hub. 
Additionally, the captains of Delta have significantly more 
experience than the first officers. Normally, the captains 
should have more years in the cockpit than the first 
officers. However, since there was a significant difference 
between both carriers, it appears that the pilot population 
in the first officer position at Delta is much less 
experienced than the rest of the sample. It will be 
important to be particularly alert to this factor while 
analyzing the remaining questions to determine if these 
first officers answer in a significantly different manner. 
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2. The initial questions determined that there was 
general agreement about how many systems were automated and 
that automated functions were utilized the majority of the 
time. There was majority agreement among the pilots that 
there is not too much automation. Their comments suggested 
that there is a choice with the amount of automation a pilot 
wishes to use. Given a choice, it is logical to expect 
their decision to balance on the side of safety. Hence, if 
an automated task presents a situation that may be unsafe, 
then the pilot will likely choose to perform that task 
manually to avoid the conflict. To determine if this were 
the case, the next step was to question whether the general 
utilization of automation and the procedures necessary for 
its implementation created any situations which may reduce 
safety. 
3. There was slightly higher disagreement among 
American pilots when asked if automation had created an 
unsafe environment. 53% of the Delta first officers agreed 
and strongly agreed that automation had created an unsafe 
environment. This is the first indication where this 
particular group differed significantly from the rest of the 
sample. The majority of the comments suggested that if the 
automation were to create a situation that may jeopardize 
safety, the pilot was apt to discontinue its use. This was 
confirmed by the results of question #13 which asked 
specifically if manual backup had to be utilized. Recalling 
the fact that there was a significant difference between the 
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years experience of the two carriers, the data suggest that 
those with less time in the cockpit are prone to feel less 
safe than those with more. This is certainly a logical 
expectation and may be the sole reason for the belief that 
an unsafe environment had been created. This is compounded 
by the fact that Delta's pilot force is very junior in the 
first officer position at the LAX hub. 
4. The questions regarding the specific use of 
automated equipment produced similar results as the general 
questions. The answers of the pilots of Delta were 
significantly different than those of American when asked if 
the FMC impacted their outside scan. It is interesting to 
note that the captains of Delta felt the FMC did negatively 
impact their outside scan. One would have expected the 
first officers to complain about the requirements of 
automation keeping them inside the cockpit too much. None 
of the pilots felt the requirements were too time consuming 
though, during the critical phases of flight. They also 
were adamant in their faith in the TCAS system and its 
overall effectiveness. 
5. There were disparate answers about the proficiency 
level maintained on these automated cockpits. Inferring 
from the comments, it appears that there are those that do 
and those that don't remain proficient and by all 
indications thus far, by choice rather than design. 
Additionally, the pilots were split again on the question of 
increased workload with more Delta pilots indicating the 
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load was increased. This again may be due to the lessor 
experience level these pilots have. The majority of all 
pilots felt that they were at minimum proficient enough to 
perform manual tasks required during emergencies. 
6. A majority agreement was found among both carriers 
indicating that the pilots felt automation induced 
complacency on the flight deck. The majority disagreed 
however, when asked if they had been complacent specifically 
in a way that detracted from their optimum performance. 
This disparity may be due to the lack of comfort with the 
automated environment for the majority. 
Conclusions 
Throughout this study a majority of the respondents 
supported automation, its usage and held the beliefs that 
the current environment implementing automation is a safe 
and manageable one. The minority who supported the belief 
that automation induces complacency, lack of proficiency or 
an unsafe environment, primarily responded from a position 
of lesser experience. This was not always the case, but was 
supported generally throughout. Hence, the hypothesis was 
supported since the attitudes and beliefs of the pilots from 
the two carriers indicated that automation is not a 
detriment to safety the majority of the time. The rejection 
of the null hypothesis also supports this conclusion since 
it helped to quantify the differences of opinion to those of 
the pilots with less experience. 
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Recommendations 
Aviation has historically been very dynamic and it 
continues to be such, as well do the advances in automated 
equipment and their operational implementation. This study 
was just one of many in the ongoing analysis of the pilot-
automation interface and the results can only suggest that 
more work need be undertaken. This fact is accentuated by 
the most recent presentation of incidents and accidents in 
the January 30, 1995 issue of Aviation Week & Space 
Technology. In this issue, numerous examples of accidents 
are documented describing the probable cause to be 
automation related with specific citations of pilot 
interface problems. One factor was continually dominant in 
these articles and was also prevalent in this study. This 
factor was that more problems are encountered, either 
perceptually or actually, the less experience the pilot has. 
Immediately, it would appear that increasing the pilots 
proficiency and experience with the automated equipment will 
help alleviate many of the perception problems discovered in 
this study. The author's experience with new equipment and 
procedures followed a similar pattern as a Naval Aviator. 
The more initial training received, the more relaxed and 
proficient one becomes. Many of the commercial airline 
training programs provide limited experience with the 
automated systems in simulated sessions due to operational 
and simulator commitments. If these sessions were to be 
increased initially, alleviation of some of these problems 
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may be realized. At the very least, additional training and 
simulator sessions should be provided for those who feel 
less comfortable and less proficient with the extensive 
modes of automation. The professional pilot should always 
admit shortcomings and seek ways to alleviate them. 
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Summary of the chi-square 
Question # 
Comparison Chi square* Significant 
1 
AAL vs. DAL 
2 
AAL vs. DAL 
-AAL Captains 
-DAL Captains 
3 
AAL vs. DAL 
-All Captains 
4 
AAL vs. DAL 
-All Captains 
5 
AAL vs. DAL 
-All Captains 
6 
AAL vs. DAL 
-AAL Captains 
-DAL Captains 
7 
AAL vs. DAL 
-AAL Captains 
-DAL Captains 
8 
AAL vs. DAL 
-All Captains 
9 
AAL vs. DAL 
-AAL Captains 
-DAL Captains 
10 
AAL vs. DAL 
-All Captains 
vs. 
vs. 
vs. 
vs. 
vs. 
vs. 
vs. 
vs. 
vs. 
vs. 
vs. 
vs. 
vs. 
First 
First 
First 
First 
First 
First 
First 
First 
First 
First 
First 
First 
First 
Officers 
Officers 
Officers 
Officers 
Officers 
Officers 
Officers 
Officers 
Officers 
Officers 
Officers 
Officers 
Officers 
0, 
14. 
9 
12. 
6. 
3. 
6. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
9, 
3 
6. 
10 
7 
4 
4 
6 
9 
1 
2 
1 
3 
.81 
.68 
.01 
.24 
.60 
.63 
.74 
.97 
.90 
.08 
.52 
.93 
.01 
.14 
.03 
.99 
.15 
.47 
.56 
.74 
.71 
.74 
.48 
NO 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
*p < .05. 
Summary of the chi-square 
Question # 
Comparison Chi square* Signifi 
11 
AAL vs. DAL 
-All Captains vs. 
12 
AAL vs. DAL 
-AAL Captains vs. 
-DAL Captains vs. 
13 
AAL vs. DAL 
-All Captains vs. 
14 
AAL vs. DAL 
-All Captains vs. 
15 
AAL vs. DAL 
-All Captains vs. 
16 
AAL vs. DAL 
-All Captains vs. 
17 
AAL vs. DAL 
-AAL Captains vs. 
-DAL Captains vs. 
18 
AAL vs. DAL 
-All Captains vs. 
First Officers 
First Officers 
First Officers 
First Officers 
First Officers 
First Officers 
First Officers 
First Officers 
First Officers 
First Officers 
1.67 No 
6.14 No 
9.70 Yes 
4.79 No 
3.82 No 
0.42 No 
0.48 No 
1.82 No 
2.52 No 
3.91 No 
0.60 No 
1.21 No 
3.21 No 
12.57 Yes 
1.43 No 
6.60 No 
6.49 No 
7.88 No 
*p < .05. 
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October 20, 1994 
William Woodrow Clark 
4649 Pomona Street 
Ventura, CA 93003 
(805) 639-0219 
American Airlines Flight Admin 
P.O. Box 92246 
World Way Postal Center (LAX) 
Los Angeles, CA 90009 
Dear Sir or Madam, 
I would like to take this opportunity to thank you for your time and efforts with this 
important endeavor. I am a foil-time student with Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University for 
the degree of Master of Aeronautical Science. This survey is being conducted to fulfill the 
requirements for my Graduate Thesis. Your participation is crucial in order for the research 
to be effective and applicable. 
Enclosed you will find a questionnaire which requests specific information regarding the 
working environment of your particular cockpit. This questionnaire is being used to 
determine the effect increased automation has on pilot performance. The answers to these 
questions will be strictly guarded with no reference made to the pilot responding. Please 
indicate your choice by circling the appropriate response. Complete confidentiality will be 
maintained. 
This study is a continuation of the numerous endeavors in this field. This issue has 
tremendous significance in terms of safety and the future utilization of automation and manual 
piloting skills. Proper choices for design and operational implementation can only be made 
from a strong position of knowledge. 
You will find the questionnaire straight forward and easily completed. I applaud your 
professionalism for the desire to enhance the knowledge of safety issues in the aviation 
community. Please respond within (2 weeks) and return the questionnaire in the envelope 
provided. This questionnaire has been approved for distribution. If you have any questions 
regarding the validity of this questionnaire, please contact Captain Jim Keller, Chief Pilot, 
American Airlines LAX office. 
Thank you again for your active participation. 
Sincerely, 
William Woodrow Clark (Woodie) 
Lieutenant USNR-R 
Naval Aviator 
enclosures 
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William Woodrow Clark 
4649 Pomona Street 
Ventura, CA 93003 
(805) 639-0219 
October 17, 1994 
Delta Air Lines, Inc. 
(LAX) 
Los Angeles, CA 90009 
Dear Sir or Madam, 
I would like to take this opportunity to thank you for your time and efforts with this 
important endeavor. I am a full-time student with Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University for 
the degree of Master of Aeronautical Science. This survey is being conducted to fulfill the 
requirements for my Graduate Thesis. Your participation is crucial in order for the research 
to be effective and applicable. 
Enclosed you will find a questionnaire which requests specific information regarding the 
working environment of your particular cockpit. This questionnaire is being used to 
determine the effect increased automation has on pilot performance. The answers to these 
questions will be strictly guarded with no reference made to the pilot responding. Please 
indicate your choice by circling the appropriate response. Complete confidentiality will be 
maintained. 
This study is a continuation of the numerous endeavors in this field. This issue has 
tremendous significance in terms of safety and the future utilization of automation and manual 
piloting skills. Proper choices for design and operational implementation can only be made 
from a strong position of knowledge. 
You will find the questionnaire straight forward and easily completed. I applaud your 
professionalism for the desire to enhance the knowledge of safety issues in the aviation 
community. Please respond within (2 weeks) and return the questionnaire in the envelope 
provided. This questionnaire has been approved for distribution. If you have any questions 
regarding the validity of this questionnaire, please contact Captain Dave Boaz, Chief Pilot, 
Delta Air Lines LAX office. 
Thank you again for your active participation. 
Sincerely, 
William Woodrow Clark (Woodie) 
Lieutenant USNR-R 
Naval Aviator 
enclosures 
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Questionnaire 
1. Are you a Captain or First Officer? 
a. Captain b. First Officer 
2. How many years experience do you have in this cockpit? 
a. < 1 b. 1-2 c. 3-4 d. 5-6 e. >6 
3. What percentage of flying skills do you think are automated? 
a. < 25 b. 25-50 c. 51-75 d. 76-90 e. >90 
4. What percentage of time do you utilize automated systems vice manual 
piloting skills, to include computations, switch selection, etc.? 
a. <25 b. 25-50 c. 51-75 d. 76-90 e. >90 
5. Do you think that too many systems, procedures or tasks dre automated? 
a. strongly b. disagree c. neutral d. agree e. strongly 
disagree agree 
6. Does the flight management computer keep you inside the cockpit too 
much, particularly during the low altitude phases of flight during 
higher traffic volume? 
a. strongly b. disagree c. neutral d. agree e. strongly 
disagree agree 
7 Are your manual flying skills deteriorating due to the extensive use of 
automation? 
a. strongly b. disagree c. neutral d. agree e. strongly 
disagree agree 
8. Are automation requirements too time consuming during the critical 
approach and landing phase? 
a. strongly b. disagree c. neutral d. agree e. strongly 
disagree agree 
9. Does automation increase your workload? 
a. strongly b. disagree c. neutral d. agree e. strongly 
disagree agree 
10. Do you believe that extensive use of automation may induce complacency 
the flight deck? 
a. strongly b. disagree c. neutral d. agree e. strongly 
disagree agree 
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11. Has automation made you complacent in a way that detracted from your 
optimal performance? 
a. strongly b. disagree c. neutral d. agree e. strongly 
disagree agree 
12. Has any form of automation created an unsafe environment in the cockpit? 
a. strongly b. disagree c. neutral d. agree e. strongly 
disagree agree 
13. Has any specific task performed by automation created a situation that 
required utilization of manual backup? 
a. strongly b. disagree c. neutral d. agree e. strongly 
disagree agree 
14 Do you fly the aircraft manually with sufficient frequency to maintain 
your skills at an acceptable level, particularly with the ability to 
perform required functions off-line during an emergency? 
a. strongly b. disagree c. neutral d. agree e. strongly 
disagree agree 
15. Has the cockpit crew grown dependent upon the use of TCAS to the 
detriment of a good lookout doctrine? 
a. strongly b. disagree c. neutral d. agree e. strongly 
disagree agree 
16. If you agree with question #15, has this dependency created an 
environment that may lead to a mishap? 
a. strongly b. disagree c. neutral d. agree e. strongly 
disagree agree 
17 Do you believe that continued implementation of automation will create 
a future cockpit environment that is more stressful or has a higher 
workload? 
a. strongly b. disagree c. neutral d. agree e. strongly 
disagree agree 
18. Will this same future implementation shift the role of the pilot from 
one of controller to one of monitor, to the detriment of the safe 
conduct of the flight? 
a. strongly b. disagree c. neutral d. agree e. strongly 
disagree agree 
Please feel free to comment on any question by #, or make any other comments 
you wish. Use the back of these sheets if desired. 
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